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INTRODUCTION
The Ethiopian government of Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam has
developed a new tactic in the civil war between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
The Eritrean people, after a long colonial history, have striven for
independence since 1961 when the Ethiopian government forcibly
annexed Eritrea to Ethiopia. In April, 1988, Mengistu turned the
recurrent drought situation in Ethiopia to his military advantage by
blocking the transport of famine aid to Eritrea, expelling all relief
workers from the northern region, and taking control of donated aid
supplies. The government has used the 1984-85 natural disaster as a
weapon against the Eritreans. Mengistu is engaged in a deliberate,
genocidal attempt to starve the Eritrean people into submission.
Mengistu wants a unified Ethiopia, apparently the main purpose
being to consolidate his power. In addition, Eritrea has clear strategic
economic significance to Ethiopia. Eritrea borders the Red Sea, an
important maritime commercial route connecting the Indian Ocean
and the Mediterranean Sea. Without Eritrea, Ethiopia would be
landlocked. Mengistu continues unsuccessful efforts to unify Ethiopia
by force, while refusing to negotiate with Eritrean military and po-
litical leaders, formed as the Eritrean Peoples' Liberation Front
(EPLF). While the Eritreans want independence, the EPLF does not
claim it will cut off Ethiopian access to the Red Sea. The Eritreans'
desire for self-determination must prevail over Mengistu's seemingly
legitimate goals. In any case, Mengistu cannot justify a policy of
widespread destruction of the civilian population in Eritrea.
Mengistu's policy of deliberate starvation constitutes genocide under
the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention).' Mengistu is com-
I G.A. Res. 2670, 3 GAOR, Part 1, U.N. Doc. A/810, 174, ratified on Jan.
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mitting genocide in Eritrea by "deliberately inflicting on [a national]
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical de-
struction in whole or in part." ' 2 Mengistu's actions in withholding
food and medical aid to famine-stricken Eritrea, as well as his refusal
to negotiate with the EPLF, indicate that destruction is his intent.
He recently promised to "not only wipe [the rebels] out, but also to
teach an unforgettable lesson" to future generations.3
The applicability of the Genocide Convention to the Eritrean sit-
uation fits previous charges of genocide against other countries. The
United Nations received charges of genocide against both the Kam-
puchean government of Pol Pot for atrocities committed by the Khmer
Rouge and Idi Amin for his actions in Uganda. Several independent
groups have charged the Paraguayan government with genocide for
policies intended to destroy the Ache Indian population. Bangladesh
attempted to try a group of Pakistanis for genocidal activities com-
mitted during Bangladesh's struggle for independence. These are only
a few of the many examples of genocide. Thus far, the United Nations
has made studies in several cases, but has punished no one.
The lack of enforcement mechanisms for the Genocide Convention
will likely result in little concrete relief for the Eritrean people. States
are required to enact domestic legislation for punishment and to try
offenders in domestic courts. The Convention provides for an inter-
national penal tribunal, but none yet exists. As a result, states must,
in effect, punish themselves for committing genocide. Nevertheless,
the symbolic force of the Genocide Convention is important. The
international community can no longer stand idly by as a government
kills its own citizens. Until the parties to the Convention enact means
of international prevention and punishment, the world community
must use available political and economic pressures to stop the Ethi-
opian government from starving its own people.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Eritrea
The Eritrean people have fought for independence from Ethiopia
for twenty-eight years, and are currently led by the Eritrean Peoples'
12, 1951. The author acknowledges the recent peace negotiations between the Ethiopian
government and the Eritrean Peoples' Liberation Front in Atlanta, Georgia. See
Scroggins, Ethiopia Peace Talks Are Bound for Egypt if Atlanta Plan Works, Atlanta
Const., Sept. 7, 1989, at Al, col. 5. Nevertheless, genocide may be punished whether
committed in the past or present.
2 Id. art. II.
Campbell, Ethiopia Restricts Famine Relief Teams, Atlanta Const., Apr. 7,
1988, at Al, col. 4 [hereinafter Campbell].
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Liberation Front (EPLF).4 In 1950, the United Nations resolved the
question of Eritrea's status following colonial rule by designating
Eritrea as an autonomous unit within an Ethiopian federation.' An
overwhelming majority of the Eritrean people supported independ-
ence, 6 so the federation was based on factors irrelevant to the Eri-
treans' wishes. 7 Haile Selassie, then the ruler of Ethiopia and an ally
of the United States, actually viewed the 1952 Federation as a step
towards recovery of territory that had been lost to colonial powers
half a century before.' The armed struggle began in 1961 after the
Eritreans realized they would never actually have the autonomy guar-
anteed in their Constitution under the federation.9 In 1962, the Ethi-
opian emperor formally abolished the federation and incorporated
Eritrea as a province in the Ethiopian empire.' 0 Eritreans claim that
the federation was contrary to the principle of self-determination."'
On the other hand, if the federation was valid, the United Nations
failed in its duty to respond to the Ethiopian breach. 12 In any case,
the Eritreans remain committed to their right to self-determination.
The right to self-determination is a threshold issue in the Eritrean/
Ethiopian conflict that requires balancing the Eritrean claim to in-
dependence against the Ethiopian interest in territorial integrity. The
United Nations Charter supports the right of peoples to self-deter-
4 Eritrea's Claim to Self-Determination, 26 INT'L COMM'N JURISTS 8 (Jun. 1981).
1 Id. Eritrea was an Italian colony until 1941 when the British defeated the
Italian forces. In 1948, the British brought the issue of the future of the territory
to the United Nations. The United Nations adopted Resolution 390A(v) on December
2, 1950, creating the Ethiopian/Eritrean federation. Id.
6 Tesfagiorgis, Self-Determination: Its Evolution and Practice by the United
Nations and its Application to the Case of Eritrea, 6(1) Wis. INT'L L. J. 75, 113
(1987) [hereinafter Tesfagiorgis]. Eritrea was an integral part of Ethiopia before
European colonial powers, attracted by the strategic location along the Red Sea,
occupied the area. Id. at 104. Fifty years of colonial rule had laid the groundwork
for a distinct Eritrean national identity. Id. at 106.
1 Yohannes, The Eritrean Question: A Colonial Case?, 25 J. MOD. AFR. STUD.,
643 (1987); [hereinafter Yohannes] see INT'L COMM'N JURISTS, supra note 4. The
solution was geo-political and not intended to respond to the Eritreans' demands.
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles expressed the disregard for the Eritreans'
desires when he stated: "[D]espite the opinions of the Eritrean people, strategic
[considerations require] that the country be linked with our ally, Ethiopia."
I Tesfagiorgis, supra note 6, at 104.
9 INT'L COMM'N JURISTS, supra note 4, at 8.
,o Id. The Eritreans now claim that the Eritrean Assembly which agreed to the
federated autonomous unit did not represent the people and had no authority to
make such an agreement. Even if the agreement was valid, the Eritreans argue that
their status could not be- changed without clear assent from the Eritrean people.
See UNITED NATIONS CHARTER arts. 1 and 55.
12 Tesfagiorgis, supra note 6, at 106.
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mination,' 3 while also stressing the importance of the territorial in-
tegrity of states. 14 The self-determination issue is clear because the
Eritrean people have consistently demonstrated their desire for in-
dependence, and have proven their ability to survive. 5 The Eritreans
view their cause as a struggle against yet another colonial power. 6
Despite Mengistu's view of a united Ethiopia, the Eritreans see them-
selves as Eritrean rather than Ethiopian. 7 The EPLF, with the help
of Eritrean expatriates, has organized and built a modernized society
that supplies most of its own basic needs." No outside power supports
the rebels.' 9 The key to answering the self-determination issue in favor
of the Eritreans is how the Eritreans view themselves and the extent
to which they have manifested their desire for independence. 20
The EPLF has indicated its ultimate goal is to establish a close
relationship with a reformed Ethiopia that will cooperate with an
independent Eritrea. 2' Eritrca occupies over 600 miles of Red Sea
coast, an area of significant economic importance to the Ethiopians. 22
Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, the current Ethiopian president,
13 U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2 and art. 55. The Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States
elaborates on the right of all peoples ". . . freely to determine, without external
interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural
development ... "
14 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
11 Tesfagiorgis, supra note 6, at 117. The Eritreans exhibit the necessary subjective
elements for defining "people" in the consciousness of their own national identity
and their asserted will to exist. Id. at 88.
The question arises of whether the United Nations was principally concerned with
the right to self-determination as related to colonial territories. Tesfagiorgis claims
that even if the Eritreans are not a colonial people, they are a people subjected to
foreign domination, as expressed in the U.N. Decl. on the Granting of Independence
to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Id. at 111.
See also Humphrey, Political and Related Rights, in Human Rights in International
Law 196 (T. Meron ed. 1984). If the word "peoples" includes only colonial peoples,
the right to self-determination means little since most colonies are now independent.
16 Kaplan, The Loneliest War, ATL. MONTHLY, Jul. 1988, at 60.
11 Yohannes, supra note 7, at 667.
1" Kifner, Rebels in Ethiopia Work to Modernize Eritrea, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21,
1988, at 1, col. 3; see Nielsen, The Eritrean Resistance, WORLD PREss REv., Dec.
1986, at 45 (with self-sufficiency as its goal, the EPLF has organized an entire
society with hospitals, schools, industry, and central administration underground).
19 Id.
20 Tesfagiorgis, supra note 6, at 117.
21 Markakis, The Nationalist Revolution in Eritrea, 26 J. MOD. AFR. STuD. 70
(1988).
22 Worthington, Eritrean Wins Put Mengistu on Defensive, Wall St. J., May 24,
1988, col. 3, at 38.
[Vol. 19:589
INTENTIONAL STARVATION
fears the EPLF will cut Ethiopia off from the sea, but the EPLF
claims it is willing to negotiate continued access. 23 Yet, Mengistu has
responded to the Eritrean's fight for independence with force and
has rejected negotiation. 24 Mengistu will not give up the fight for a
unified Ethiopia.
The Dergue, Ethiopia's military junta, maintains the attitude ev-
idenced by the slogan "Ethiopia first."' 25 This attitude is not unique
to Ethiopia; it prevails among African countries that adhere to the
Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.) policy not to recognize in-
ternal opposition parties in order to preserve unity. 26 As a result, the
EPLF has little support from other African leaders or any other
outside powers. 2
7
The goal of unity is generally legitimate, but it encounters two
obstacles in relation to Eritrea. One is the Eritreans' widely-held
desire for self-determination. The history of African countries has
largely been one of escape from colonial domination and the Eritrean
situation is no exception. The second obstacle is the military strength
of the EPLF. Mengistu's prevailing objective is to destroy the EPLF,21
but by most accounts the armed struggle is at a stalemate. 29 As a
23 See Telegram from Osman Saleh Sabbe, Chairman of the Central Council of
the Eritrean Liberation Front, to President Jimmy Carter, Feb. 27, 1978, Jimmy
Carter Library, Atlanta, Ga. Mr. Sabbe asked for the United States and Soviet
Union to help solve the Eritrean problem, keeping in mind the Eritreans' wish for
independence, while providing for Ethiopian access to the Eritrean ports because
"we [the Eritreans] are not after all against the common economic, commercial and
security interests between Eritrea and Ethiopia."
24 Dawit, Power and Famine in Ethiopia, Wall St. J., Jan. 12, 1987, at 24. Dawit
was Commissioner of Relief and Rehabilitation in Ethiopia during the 1974-75
drought and from 1983 to 1985. In 1985, he defected to the United States. He was
also the Deputy Foreign Minister and Governor of Eritrea.
25 Markakis, supra note 21, at 62; see Yohannes, supra note 7, at 651 (the
indivisibility of socialist Ethiopia is not negotiable).
26 18 AFR. CoNTEmp. Rec. 285 (C. Legum ed. 1985-86); see Yohannes, supra note
7, at 662.
27 Yohannes, supra note 7, at 662; see also Update on Recent Developments in
Ethiopia: The Famine Crisis: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and
Int'l Org. and On Africa of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4 (1988) [hereinafter Hearing] (United States relations with Ethiopia reflect
the policy of supporting the territorial integrity of African nations and only providing
humanitarian aid).
28 Highfield, A Dangerous Model for the Third World, 114 N. STATESMAN, Dec.
11, 1987, at 20.
29 Bazyler, Reexamining the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of
the Atrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia, 23 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 554 (1987); see
Petrie, Eritrea Struggles - as West Yawns, [Wall St. J.], Oct. 21, 1987, at 37 (the
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result, Mengistu has begun to use the drought to his advantage by
cutting off aid to EPLF-held areas and expelling relief workers from
Eritrea. 30 Unification is no longer a valid goal when it entails killing
large parts of the civilian population by deliberate starvation.
Eritrea, along with other regions of northern Ethiopia, was one
of the areas hardest hit by the drought of 1984-85, where reports
indicated total crop failure." Estimates are that the number of people
threatened with starvation has reached over two million, with the
majority in the north.3 2 Other sources indicate that nearly one million
people have already died. 3 Drought and famine threatened again in
1987, but the drought may be only a secondary cause of the continued
famine in Eritrea. The Ethiopian government's military, political,
agricultural, and fiscal policies may, in fact, be the most immediate
cause of the famine. 34 The collectivization of agriculture combined
with Mengistu's failure to implement effective programs to deal with
the drought have worsened the results of the natural disaster.35
Prevention of aid distribution to Eritrea is another of Mengistu's
policies that has made the effects of the drought more severe. Al-
though the focus is on the most recent actions, starvation has been
one of the Dergue's weapons against the unyielding north since the
likelihood of peace is small as the EPLF has been unsuccessful in getting the Ethiopian
government to the negotiating table, and other countries do not seem willing to
participate in the process); see also Markakis supra note 21, at 69 (the war is no
nearer resolution, and a military solution is unrealistic).
30 Campbell, supra note 3; see, Suau, Region in Rebellion: Eritrea, 168 NAT'L
GEOGRAPMC, Sept. 1985, at 384. The Eritrean Relief Association, operating from
Sudan, claims to reach only one fifth of the 1.5 million threatened by famine. Most
of the food aid destined for Ethiopia arrives at Ethiopian-controlled ports, so the
government can direct distribution. See also Markakis, supra note 21, at 69 (inter-
national donations to Ethiopia are substantial, but the Dergue continues to hamper
food supply to Eritrea).
3, Int'l. Herald Tribune, Oct. 22 - Nov. 4, 1987, at 7405, col. 2.
32 Dep't St. Bull., Jun. 1988, at 21.
13 Bazyler, supra note 29, at 554.
3" Worthington, supra note 22; see Bazyler, supra note 29, at 558-59. In 1975,
Mengistu collectivized all agriculture, and agriculture production, which had always
been sufficient under individual farming methods, declined. Farmers have little
incentive to increase production, as they must sell a large part of their surplus to
the government at below-market prices. Ethiopia must purchase food from other
countries, but the government's large military expenditures, estimated at forty percent
of Ethiopia's budget, have limited the available resources. Only three percent of the
budget goes to famine relief. See also Politics Feed Hunger Problem in Ethiopia,
Atlanta Const., Jan. 6, 1988, at A10, col. 1 [hereinafter Politics Feed Hunger].
35 Id.
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Dergue came to power in 1974 and famine struck in the mid-1970s.36
Claiming the action was necessary to "maintain unity and territorial
integrity" and to protect the safety of relief workers, in April, 1988,
Mengistu blocked the transport of famine aid to Eritrea. 31 The action
was clearly an attempt to force an end to the struggle for independence
by cutting off all relief to the Eritreans.38 The Ethiopian government
claims the action was necessary to protect relief workers because the
EPLF had attacked aid convoys in the past.3 9 The Eritreans insist
that they previously attacked aid convoys because the Ethiopian
regime sent military supplies for the Ethiopian army with the aid.4
Contrary to Ethiopian claims, others see the expulsion as allowing
Mengistu to pursue his genocidal policies in the northern regions
without any witnesses to hinder his actions.4 '
Although Ethiopia received enough aid from around the world to
feed the starving, the Eritrean people have received little of that
food.4 2 As of April, 1988, approximately two and a half million
people are trapped behind military lines with no access to international
relief assistance. 43 In 1986, famine victims were required to travel to
relief centers, but most of the victims lived too far away or feared
harassment from Ethiopian troops near the towns." The government
refused to negotiate delivery with the EPLF or guarantee safe passage
16 Kaplan, supra note 16, at 61.
17 Campbell, supra note 3.
31 Id. Evidence that the April 6, 1988, action is actually an attempt to deliberately
starve the Eritreans includes government limitations on food distribution before the
relief agencies were expelled, government threats to destroy relief trucks, demands
for back taxes, joining the army, or resettlement before receiving aid, and restrictions
on the flow of information. Campbell, Ethiopia Using Food as Tactic in War Against
Rebel North, Atlanta Const., Jun. 28, 1988, at Al, col.4; see also Bazyler, supra
note 29, at 563 (the government distributes aid to areas it controls and denies aid
to areas controlled by the rebels); Suau, supra note 30, at 388 (the Ethiopian policy
is to starve the rebels into submission).
19 Eritrea: A Crucible of Misery, Time, Aug. 1, 1988, at 32.
40 Attacking the Victims, Newsweek, Nov. 9, 1987, at 56. The EPLF wants relief
agencies to seek clearance with the EPLF for safe passage. See Highfield, supra
note 28. The EPLF does not want to disrupt genuine aid distribution, but legitimately
attacks convoys carrying food and ammunition for the Ethiopian army.
4' Hearing, supra note 27, at 22 (Statement of Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary
of State, Bureau for African Affairs).
42 Id. at 4. The international community pledged 1.3 million metric tons of food
for 1988, which was enough to meet the needs of the starving.
43 Id.
" Tucker, In Ethiopia, Food is a Weapon, The Nation, Feb. 8, 1986, at 140.
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of supplies across military lines,45 but voluntary relief organizations
could still access the areas. With Mengistu's recent action blocking
passage of aid, the Eritrean people are cut off from donations sent
to Ethiopia.46
In 1984, the United Nations established a special office for emer-
gency operations in Addis Ababa to coordinate the relief effort.4 7
The United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution dealing
with the critical situation in Africa and the need for "the international
community... [to provide] immediate emergency relief.. ."4 The in-
ternational community responded generously; the real challenge was
not the availability of food, but distribution hampered by Ethiopia's
difficult geography, the shortage of transport vehicles, and military
activity in the north.
49
Although the Ethiopian government would not allow increased
United Nations aid to the northern region, the United Nations has
denied allegations that the Ethiopian government is deliberately starv-
ing the Eritreans.5O United Nations officials have insisted that dis-
tribution is the only problem. Improvements in food distribution were
achieved from 1985 to 1987, but the inability to accurately predict
rainfall creates a precarious situation.5 The United Nations coordi-
41 Id. The government took relief vehicles to transport troops and materials, and
diverted some food to its own soldiers. The United Nations director of relief denied
that soldiers robbed famine victims of food rations, citing as authority the former
Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Dawit Georgis. K. Jansson, The
Emergency Relief Operation - An Inside View, in TrE ETmopIN FAmME 55 (1987).
Interestingly, Dawit also claimed that Ethiopian government policies are responsible
for much needless death and suffering in Eritrea. Dawit, supra note 24.
In 1986, Dr. Ron Brauman, Director of Doctors Without Borders, already claimed
that Mengistu "massively misappropriated" Western aid by preventing distribution
to the starving in order to pressure the Eritreans. Hearing, supra note 27, at 7.
"6 Campbell, supra note 3.
47 Jansson, supra note 45, at 1.
" G.A. Res. 39/29, 83 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/39/L.22 (1984).
49 Jansson, supra note 45, at 5. As calculated in November 1984, an estimated
7.9 million people needed approximately 1,330,000 metric tons of food for the
following twelve month period. Eritrea was among the worst hit regions, and the
EPLF established its own relief organization with food transported from Sudan. Id.
During the 1984-1986 famine, Eritreans in EPLF-controlled zones depended exclu-
sively on their own resources and aid from nongovernmental organizations for help.
The result was 500,000 people stranded within Eritrea and nearly one million forced
to flee to Sudan. Petrie, supra note 29.
" Jansson, supra note 45, at 50. Mengistu insisted that the government would
provide aid to the north. The only way to increase outside aid to Eritrea was over-
the-border shipping from Sudan by private organizations.
11 Harden, Worldwide Relief Effort Works Astounding Changes in Ethiopia,
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nated the Ethiopian relief effort, but when the government expelled
over fifty relief workers from the northern war zones, the United
Nations stopped dramatizing the famine's threat to people in the
north and only mildly criticized the action.5 2
Confronted with reports that Mengistu is using the famine as a
weapon against the Eritrean people, the United Nations must use the
means available to stop this violation of human rights and prevent
genocide. In the Ethiopian situation, the appropriate basis for action
is the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide.53
B. The Genocide Convention
The word "genocide" derives from the Greek word "genos" (race,
tribe) and the Latin word "cide" (killing), denoting the destruction
of a nation or an ethnic group.54 Genocide signifies "a coordinated
plan of different actions aimed at destroying essential foundations
of life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups
themselves." 55 An essential element of the crime is a specific intent
to destroy a group. On December 11, 1946, the United Nations
General Assembly passed Resolution 96-I defining genocide as "the
denial of the right of existence of entire human groups" such as to
shock the conscience.5 6
Wash. Post, Dec. 8, 1985, at 2, col. 1. In 1984, only one out of ten of the 7.9
million Ethiopian famine victims received food aid; in 1985, the U.N. estimated that
nine out of ten people had food.
32 Campbell & Scroggins, Selective Starvation in War Zones Triggers Selective
Anger Abroad, Atlanta Const., Jun. 26, 1988, at Al, col. 2. The United Nations
has been so careful in dealing with the Ethiopian government, that it has masked
the famine's origins and confused the donating public about the destination of relief
aid.
11 Genocide Convention, supra note 1.
14 R. LEMKIN, Axis RULE N OCCUPIED EUROPE 79 (1944). The atrocities committed
by the Nazis during World War II, and the refusal of the Nuremberg Tribunal in
the War Crimes trials to accept jurisdiction over crimes against humanity in times
of peace, prompted Lemkin to begin a campaign for an international agreement
defining genocide and procedures for its prevention and punishment.
55 Id. "Genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation,
except when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation ... Genocide
is directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are
directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of a
national group."
516 G.A. Res. 96(I), U.N. Doc. A/64, at 188-89 (1946), reprinted in U.N. Journal,
No. 58: Supp. A - A/P.V/55, at 476 (1946).
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The Genocide Convention states that "genocide, whether committed
in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international
law which [the Contracting Parties] undertake to prevent and to
punish. '5 7 Ethiopia was one of the first countries to ratify the Con-
vention in 1949.58 Article II of the Convention, in relevant part,
defines genocide as "deliberately inflicting on [a national] group
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction
in whole or in part."5 9 The purpose of the Genocide Convention is
to mobilize the world's collective conscience by prohibiting, under
international law, the intentional destruction of "a national, ethnical,
racial, or religious group,'' 6° and to prevent the recurrence of gen-
ocide. 6' While many commentators state that the Genocide Convention
has failed in its ultimate goal to deter genocide, 62 other commentators
assert that the Convention has had a positive impact in the devel-
opment of international law. 63
The Genocide Convention is a landmark because it makes inter-
national law applicable to individuals as well as states.A4 Article IV
provides that "persons committing genocide or any of the other acts
enumerated in Article III shall be punished, whether they are con-
stitutionally responsible rulers, public officials, or private indivi-
duals." '65 Individuals may have obligations even without a treaty
signed by their own states.A6
The Genocide Convention went a step further than both the United
Nations Charter and the Nuremberg Charter by designating genocide
a crime if committed during time of peace as well as war. 67 A state
cannot destroy its own citizens with impunity by claiming sovereign
11 Genocide Convention, supra note 1, Art. I.
58 Id.
9 Id., Art. II(c).
6 Id., Art. II.
61 Edwards, Contributions of the Genocide Convention to the Development of
International Law, 8 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 300 (1981).
62 Lane, Mass Killings by Governments: Lawful in the World Legal Order?, 12
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 239 (1979); Leiser, Victims of Genocide, 8 OHIo N.U.L.
REv. 315 (1981).
63 Edwards, supra note 61, at 300; Starkman, Genocide and International Law:
Is There a Cause of Action?, 8 ASILS INT'L L. J. 1 (1984).
" Genocide Convention, supra note 1, Art. IV.
61 Id. Art. IV.
66 Edwards, supra note 61, at 306.
67 Genocide Convention, supra note 1, Art. I. "[G]enocide, whether committed
in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law. .. "
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rights.68 The mere existence of the Genocide Convention and con-
demnatory resolutions in the United Nations indicate broader re-
cognition of human rights as an area of universal concern and the
need to protect them.69 The next step is to implement procedures for
actual protection.
A problem with the Genocide Convention is that the enforcement
mechanisms are weak, rendering the Convention virtually unenforce-
able. 70 In fact, many instances of mass killings have occurred since
the Convention's ratification.7' The Convention is not self-executing;
the parties must adopt the provisions into domestic law.72 Art. VI
provides that "persons charged with genocide... shall be tried by a
competent tribunal of the State [where] the act was committed, or
by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction. ..
The first part, in effect, requires a state to punish itself for committing
genocide, and the second part is meaningless as no such international
court yet exists.
Referral of genocide charges to any other international legislative
body, as provided in Article VIII (to competent United Nations
bodies) and Article IX (to the International Court of Justice), en-
counters the obstacle of state sovereignty. 74 Many states have not
11 Lemkin, supra note 54, at 145.
69 Starkman, supra note 63, at 17; see Edwards, supra note 61, at 306.
70 Starkman, supra note 63, at 8.
7, Evidence of genocide since passage of the Convention includes the attempt by
the People's Republic of China to destroy the Tibetans as a religious group from
1959 to 1960, and similar actions against the Tutsi people in Rwanda in 1964. In
1966, thousands of Ibos tribespeople died during Nigeria's civil war at the hands
of the government. In 1971, an estimated 1.3 million Bengalis and Hindus suffered
from East Pakistan's attempt to prevent the establishment of Bangladesh as an
independent state. Starkman, supra note 63, at 14.
More recently, the Laos government committed what could be termed genocide
against the Hmong in 1981. Other large-scale killings include the actions of the Pol
Pot regime in Cambodia (1975-78), with an estimated three million dead, and the
practices of Idi Amin in Uganda (1971-78). Large scale destruction of groups of
people clearly continues, but the Genocide Convention may nevertheless have had
an influence on members. Over half the states of the world are parties, yet only
two of those states (East Pakistan and Laos) committed genocide while members.
Edwards, supra note 61, at 303.
72 Genocide Convention, supra note 1, Art. V. A related obstacle is that no
uniform model legislation exists so the provisions may vary from state to state.
Starkman, supra note 63, at 8.
71 Id. at Art. VI.
7, Lane, supra note 62, at 262. Article VIII allows a contracting party to "call
upon the competent organs of the U.N. to take [appropriate] action under the [U.N.
Charter]," and Article IX relegates the resolution of "disputes between the Con-
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ratified the Genocide Convention because of a perceived reduction
in sovereignty due to the Convention's provision for recourse to
international bodies for resolution of conflicts. 75
Additionally, international enforcement through the United Nations
General Assembly or Security Council is unlikely as any coercive
action must be connected to acts or threats of aggression, and en-
forcement is possible only against contracting parties.76 Mengistu's
interruption of aid distribution to Eritrea may constitute aggression
as commonly understood, but the United Nations definition of ag-
gression seems to include only an act of one state against another. 77
Eritrea must first emerge as an independent state.
Thus far, no state or individual has been punished for committing
genocide, 78 although procedures for reporting violations of the Con-
vention exist and have been used. The United Nations Human Rights
Commission and its Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrim-
ination and Protection of Minorities are principally concerned with
examination of human rights violations. 79 The Commission's Reso-
lution 8 specifies that the Commission may study and investigate
situations showing consistent patterns of human rights violations, and
pass resolutions suggesting possible action.8 0 The Sub-Commission
may also use the "1503" procedure to inquire, report, and make
recommendations to the Commission on gross human rights viola-
tions. 81 This procedure is non-sanctioning.8 2 Neither procedure has
tracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application, or fulfillment of the
Convention" to the International Court of Justice. Genocide Convention, supra note
1, arts. VIII & IX.
" States refuse to be bound by Articles VIII and IX for fear of outside interference
in domestic affairs. Lane, supra note 62, at 262.
76 Id.
Definition of Aggression, arts. 1 and 3.
78 Leiser, supra note 62, at 317.
19 Lane, supra note 62, at 269.
10 E.S.C. Res. 8, 42 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 6) at 131, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
940 (1967). Both the Commission and the Sub-Commission may pass resolutions
concerning gross violations. The Sub-Commission must discuss gross violations, and
by drawing public attention to the acts, may put pressure on the governments
concerned. Lane, supra note 62, at 269.
11 E.S.C. Res. 1503, 48 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. IA) at 8, U.N. Doc. E/4832/
Add. 1 (1970). The Sub-Commission created a working group to meet privately once
a year to discuss communications relating to gross human rights violations. The
communications must be based on direct and reliable evidence, and if they survive
the conditions of admissibility, the Sub-Commission may refer them to the Com-
mission for study. The beneficial result of the procedure is unclear, but the structure
must be understood in the context of noninterference with states' rights. Lane, supra
note 62, at 269-273.
82 Id.
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been used to its full extent despite evidence of acts of genocide.83
The closest application of the Genocide Convention has been against
the Kampuchean government for atrocities committed under Pol Pot.Y
When first presented with genocide charges against the Khmer Rouge,
the United Nations took minimal action. The United Nations Com-
mission on Human Rights invited the Kampuchean government to
comment on the charges, and the government responded by rejecting
them.85 At the 1979 annual meeting, the Sub-Commission presented
a report labeling the acts of the Pol Pot regime as "nothing less
than auto-genocide," but the United Nations did nothing.8 6
Current efforts are being made to bring a charge of genocide against
the Khmer Rouge before the International Court of Justice.87 Article
IX of the Genocide Convention provides that "disputes between the
Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or ful-
fillment of the present Convention, including those relating to the
responsibility of a State for genocide. . ., shall be submitted to the
International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties
to the dispute.''8 Democratic Kampuchea accepted the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court, and Australia has expressed an interest in
bringing the case.89 The dispute required for court jurisdiction involves
the charges of genocide that several states presented to the United
' See supra note 71, and infra notes 85 and 102.
', Stanton, Kampuchean Genocide and the World Court, 2 CONN. J. INT'L L.
341 (1987).
85 L. KUPER, THE PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE 90 (1985). Atrocities committed
during the forced evacuation of the Cambodian capital, Phnom Penh, by the Khmer
Rouge in 1975 were immediately known to the outside world, yet the United Nations
did not take action until 1978. The governments of Canada, Norway, the United
Kingdom, the United States, and Australia, as well as Amnesty International and
the International Commission of Jurists made submissions, with supporting docu-
mentation, to the Commission on Human Rights (Commission) concerning the
activities in Cambodia. The majority of the Commission rejected a resolution to
make a study of the human rights situation with the cooperation of the Kampuchean
government. Instead, the Commission passed the resolution inviting the government's
comments.
Id. The majority of the Commission voted to postpone consideration of the
report labeling the Kampuchean activities "autogenocide" until the 1980 session.
During that time, the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia, and prosecution of Pol Pot
and the former deputy prime minister on charges of genocide was left to the new
regime.
87 Stanton, supra note 84.
" Genocide Convention, supra note 1, art. IX.
9 Stanton, supra note 84, at 343.
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Nations and the Democratic Kampuchean government's rejection of
the charges as an interference in domestic affairs. 90
Despite the enforcement problems, the Genocide Convention is not
completely ineffective. The genocide prohibition is emerging as cus-
tomary international law, indicating that an overwhelming majority
of states recognize a legal obligation not to engage in the practice. 9'
Voluntary compliance with the Convention may lead to an author-
itative rule of law even if the Convention lacks enforcement me-
chanisms. 92 By making genocide a crime under international law, the
Convention established the right of intervention to prevent destruction
of minorities. 93 Commission of an international crime concerns all
states, 94 and all states have a legal interest in the prohibition and
punishment under the theory of erga omnes.95 Any state can take
jurisdiction over genocidal acts regardless of the offender's nationality
and the place of commission."
III. ANALYsIs
As the first United Nations human rights instrument, the Genocide
Convention was the departure point in the adoption of effective
90 Id. at 346. Australia, Norway, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United
States brought charges against the Kampuchean government in 1978.
91 The act of genocide does not necessarily negate customary international law.
Starkman, supra note 63, at 12.
A rule from a treaty may become international law independent of the original
treaty source based on state practice. As a result of the Convention, genocide is
recognized internationally as a crime even in non-party states. Edwards, supra note
61, at 305. Nevertheless, Leiser disputes any practical effect of the Genocide Con-
vention because labeling genocide an international crime means little if the inter-
national community cannot stop genocide, and is unwilling or unable to punish it.
Leiser, supra note 62, at 317.
92 Id.
93 Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime under International Law, 41 AM. J. INT'L L.
150 (1947). See also International Law Commission Draft Convention on State
Responsibility, I.L.C. Rep. 175 (1976). ". . .an international crime may result from.. .a
serious breach on a widespread scale of an international obligation of essential
importance for safeguarding the human being, such as those prohibit-
ing... genocide. . ." Id.
" I.L.C. Rep. 54-59 (1985).
91 Barcelona Traction Light and Power Co., Ltd, 1970 I.C.J. 1, 32. The doctrine
of erga omnes provides that states have certain obligations towards the international
community as a whole, and that all states have an interest in the protection of these
rights.
9 Id.; see also, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNTrED
STATES § 404 (1987). A state may exercise jurisdiction to define and punish certain
offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as,
genocide, even where [the conduct does not occur in its territory or directly affect
its nationals].
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international measures to prevent and punish human rights viola-
tions.Y An analysis of the nature of the group, the intent requirement,
and the extent of destruction as concerns Eritrea reveals that the
Ethiopian government is committing, or attempting to commit, the
crime of genocide. The activities of the Ethiopian government in
blocking famine aid to Eritrea threaten not only members of the
EPLF but also the entire Eritrean civilian population with destruc-
tion. 9s Mengistu promises to "not only wipe [the rebels] out but also
to teach an unforgettable lesson" to future generations." Thus, his
actions are directed against the Eritrean people with the aim of
destroying its independent existence.
The Eritreans fit into Article II of the Genocide Convention as a
"national" group. The EPLF has fought for an independent Eritrea
for twenty-eight years. A national liberation movement combines the
mobilization of popular support with a commitment to self-reliance.'°°
The American Heritage Dictionary defines a nation as a group with
one usually independent government, or a federation.' 0 ' The Eritreans
have declared themselves independent, and the EPLF has established
a nearly self-sufficient underground society in Eritrea. °2 Furthermore,
the formation of the federation between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1950
indicates that the United Nations recognized the Eritreans as an
autonomous group.
A more difficult task is to find Mengistu's specific intent to destroy
the Eritrean national group as required by Article II of the Genocide
Convention.103 The focus is on the group, and individuals are attacked
only because they are members of the group.0 4 The drafters likened
genocide to homicide, with its necessary criminal deliberation, against
a group. 05 The strictness of the intent requirement has provided a
Lippman, The Drafting of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide, 3 B.U. INT'L. L.J. 1 (1985); see also Kutner,
A World Genocide Tribunal - Rampart Against Future Genocide, 18 VAL. U. L.
Rev. 373 (1984).
" Bazyler, supra note 29, at 559.
" Campbell, supra note 3.
i00 BEBIND THE WAR IN ERITREA 7 (1980).
101 AmEmcAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 831 (2d ed. 1982).
102 Kifner, supra note 18.
103 Genocide Convention, supra note 1, art. II (emphasis added).
104 Lemkin, supra note 93, at 147; See, Lemkin, supra note 54, at 79. "[G]enocide
is a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential
foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups
themselves."
los 3(1) U.N. GAOR C.6 (63rd mtg.) at 6 (1948). "Genocide denotes a criminal
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defense against charges under the Genocide Convention for causing
mass deaths.' °
"The partial or total destruction of a group unaccompanied by the
intent for such a result is not genocide. An act may be punished
as genocide upon proof of intent to destroy the group regardless
of the result. An intended action that results in destruction of a
group without intent to eliminate the group is not genocide."' 07
The Paraguayan government used this defense to counter charges of
genocide against the Ache Indians, claiming that government actions
inadvertently harmed the Indian population.108 The application of the
Genocide Convention to Idi Amin's random killing in Uganda from
1971 to 1978 demonstrates the difficulty of drawing a line between
the intent to destroy a specific group and indiscriminate killing. °9
Charges of genocide against other countries further illustrate the
nature of the intent requirement and emphasize the applicability of
the Genocide Convention to the Eritrean situation. The atrocities
committed by the Nazis clearly evidenced a genocidal intent, but not
all cases are so obvious. An estimated 50% of the Ache Indian
population in Paraguay has disappeared due to Paraguayan govern-
ment actions in commercially exploiting the forests, but the govern-
ment has denied any genocidal intent to destroy."10 The Indians occupy
areas of Paraguay that are prime for economic development,"' and
several organizations have charged the government with committing
genocidal extermination of the Ache by physical killing, deliberate
starvation and semi-starvation, and incarceration on Indian reser-
vations. 12 In 1974, the International League for the Rights of Man
formally charged the Paraguayan government with genocide before
plan to exterminate a people." Campbell, Law Against Hunger as a Weapon, Atlanta
Const., Jun. 26, 1988, at All, col. 1.
106 Lane, supra note 62, at 262.
'07 P. DROST, THE CRIME OF STATE 82 (1959).
'0' GENOCIDE IN PARAGUAY 15 (R. Arens ed. 1976).
101 Lane, supra note 62, at 262.
110 Arens, A Lawyer's Summation, GENOCIDE IN PARAGUAY 139 (1976).
- Munzel, Manhunt, GENOCIDE IN PARAGUAY 38 (1976). The area attracts large
foreign companies engaged in developing forest industries and grazing land.
112 Id. In 1974, separate statements by the Paraguayan Bishops' Conference and
the Department of Missions of the Paraguayan Conference of Catholic Bishops
charged the government with genocide. Arens, supra note 110, at 141. In 1973 and
1974, Senator Abourezk denounced the genocidal activities of the Paraguayan gov-
ernment from the floor of the United States Senate, and called for an end to
American aid to Paraguay. Arens, supra note 108, at 13.
[Vol. 19:589
INTENTIONAL STARVATION
the United Nations Secretary-General." 3 The Ache Indians have no
political aspirations that make them dangerous to the government, 14
but they are inconvenient to the development of industry and agri-
culture. I I5
The actions of the Paraguayan government against the forest Indian
population resemble actions of the Ethiopian government against
Eritrea. The apparent goal is to cause eventual extinction of the Ache
ethnic group. 1 6 Like the Ache, the Eritreans hinder the Ethiopian
government economically by blocking access to the Red Sea, and
elimination of the population is a solution to the problem.
The most obvious distinction between the Eritrean situation and
the situation of the Ache Indians is that the Eritreans are engaged
in a civil war with Ethiopia. EPLF military advances in the northern
territory threaten the foundation of what Mengistu considers the
Ethiopian state." 7 Putting aside the question of the Eritreans' right
to self-determination, the difficulty lies in distinguishing genocide
from deaths normally occurring in the course of war. Inevitably,
civilians die during a war, but a legitimate war is directed against
states/governments and armed forces, and not against general pop-
ulations." 8 When the destruction focuses on a specific civilian pop-
ulation, genocide occurs. Mengistu initially directed his actions against
the EPLF, but he cannot eliminate the EPLF using conventional
military tactics. By blocking aid to Eritrea, Mengistu is trying to
force the EPLF into submission by hurting the entire northern civilian
population. Mengistu's actions are now directed against the Eritrean
people, even if Mengistu is ultimately aiming for members of the
EPLF. The intent is in the act. Mengistu cannot hide behind the
intent requirement of the Genocide Convention by claiming that he
really does not want to destroy the Eritrean people, but only the
EPLF fighters, when he is actually attempting to starve the general
population. Mengistu has now directed his efforts towards widespread
extermination.
The genocide label has been applied retrospectively to government-
imposed famine on a national group. Although the Genocide Con-
vention did not exist at the time, the label attaches to Stalin's de-
l" Arens, supra note 108, at 12.
114 Munzel, supra note 111, at 38.
"I Arens, supra note 110, at 141.
116 Arens, supra note 108, at 13.
117 Kaplan, supra note 16, at 59.
118 Lemkin, supra note 54, at 80.
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liberate starvation of the Ukrainian people in the 1930's.119 The
Ukrainian peasantry, largely ignored in Soviet politics, became con-
scious of its national identity and was unwilling to obey Moscow in
arranging its internal affairs. 20 In sum, to destroy the Ukrainian
nation as a political factor, Stalin collectivized agriculture and imposed
disproportionate grain quotas on Ukrainian farmers.21 Border check-
points prevented people from leaving or entering the region with food
supplies. 122 The people could not meet the quotas and feed themselves,
and an estimated five to seven million Ukrainians starved.' 23 The
Ukrainian resistance stopped; the famine weapon had taught sub-
mission. 2
Mengistu's actions in Eritrea parallel Stalin's in the Ukraine. Al-
though his tactics are different, Mengistu is using famine as a weapon
against the Eritreans. A major difficulty arises in applying the Gen-
ocide Convention to either case, as well as to many others, because
the Convention excludes mass murder on political grounds.' 25 Thus,
Stalin's actions are seemingly not genocide because he wanted to
destroy the Ukrainian nation as a political factor.'1 Mengistu's goal
of unification is partly political, but his major underlying motive is
also economic. Genocidal incentives may be economic as groups
compete for space or resources.' 27 Mengistu does not want to negotiate
access to the Red Sea, so his perceived alternative is to attack the
Eritrean people.
Many people die during wars, but war does not excuse genocide,
especially when the war itself may not be legitimate. The issue goes
back to the Eritreans' right to self-determination. The Eritrean sit-
uation may be compared to the dispute in the early 1970's between
the Bengalis of East Pakistan, seeking self-determination, and the
"I Mace, The Man-Made Famine of 1933 in the Soviet Ukraine: What Happened
and Why?, in TowARD THE UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE 67 (I.
Charny ed. 1984).
120 Id. at 69.
121 Id. at 74. The punishment for failure to meet quotas was execution or prison
for individuals, and a complete economic blockade for villages.
'1 Id. at 75.
121 Id. at 78.
124 Id. at 80.
12, Fein, Scenarios of Genocide: Models of Genocide and Critical Responses,
TowARD THE UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE 3 (I. Charny ed. 1984).
12 Mace, supra note 119, at 67.
121 Fein, supra note 125, at 5.
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government of West Pakistan. 128 As Pakistan's hopes for preventing
Bengali independence diminished, the Pakistan army engaged in a
massive onslaught, killing millions of Bengalis. 129 Twenty-two non-
governmental organizations presented a complaint to the Commission
on Human Rights, but the United Nations failed to take any concrete
action. 130 When the Bengalis finally won independence and formed
the new state of Bangladesh, the United Nations stopped any action,
evidently considering the genocide issue resolved.' The government
of Bangladesh tried to take steps of its own to redress the extensive
killings.
In 1973, the new state of Bangladesh sought to try 195 Pakistani
nationals for genocide committed during Bangladesh's struggle for
independence.132 The Bangladesh court claimed jurisdiction under
Article VI of the Genocide Convention which provides that "persons
charged with genocide... shall be tried by a competent tribunal of
the State in the territory of which the act was committed... 133 The
trials never actually took place because of politics, not lack of ju-
risdiction.' 34
In each of the cases mentioned, the destruction did not have to
eliminate the entire targeted population before it constituted genocide,
although total annihilation may have been the goal. Mengistu does
not have to physically eliminate every Eritrean to accomplish his
objectives. Genocide does not necessarily entail the immediate de-
struction of the entire group, '3 but actions must harm a large enough
In Kuper, The United Nations and Genocide: A Program of Action, TOWARD
THE UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE 296, 298 (I. Charny ed. 1984).
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.; see INTERNATIONAL COMMSSION OF JURISTS, THE EVENTS IN EAST PAKISTAN
56 (1971). The Commission questions whether all action by the Pakistan army was
genocide, but finds that specific acts may qualify. The intent must be to destroy
members of a group "as such," and genocide has a more precise meaning than any
large scale massacre of civilians.
132 Paust & Blaustein, War Crimes Jurisdiction and Due Process: The Bangladesh
Experience, 11 VA~N. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1978).
'" Genocide Convention, supra note 1, Art. VI; Paust & Blaustein, supra note
132, at 21. Neither Bangladesh nor Pakistan had any national implementing legislation
for the Genocide Convention, but universal jurisdiction was possible because genocide
is a crime against humanity even if it is not a violation of domestic law.
'14 Id. at 34. India's repatriation of the Pakistanis did not end the duty to prosecute
for acts of genocide, but merely transferred the responsibility to Pakistan. Id. at
37.
" Lemkin, supra note 54, at 79.
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number to destroy the group as a viable entity. 36 Article II of the
Genocide Convention providing that destruction of the group can be
"in whole or in part" has caused much debate.3 7 Lemkin stated that
genocide is not necessarily the immediate destruction of the entire
nation, but destruction of the essential foundations of life with the
aim of eliminating the group.'38 In debates over the Genocide Con-
vention, the United States Senate has claimed that the intent must
be to destroy the entire group, although actions may only partially
eliminate the group.3 9 No other state has ratified the Genocide Con-
vention with a similar understanding, suggesting that an intent to
destroy "in part" is sufficient so long as the actions are substantial
enough to affect the entirety.' 40
Mengistu's prevention of aid distribution to Eritrea is calculated
to eliminate Eritrea as an independent entity. Even if the actions
were solely against the EPLF, the result would be the same. Without
the efforts of the EPLF, supplying the organizational structure in
Eritrea, the Eritrean people would have to rely completely on the
Ethiopian government for survival. Starving Eritreans cannot fight,
nor can they support the EPLF. Mengistu may wish only to pressure
the Eritreans into submission, not to destroy them, but a promise
to stop fighting if the victim gives in does not negate genocide,
especially where a large part of the group is destroyed to subdue the
rest. '4'
Showing the application of the Genocide Convention to Mengistu's
actions in Eritrea is essential to bring a formal charge to the United
Nations, but the obstacle remains of extending the Convention beyond
its symbolic meaning to actual enforcement. To charge a state or
individual with genocide is both politically and functionally compli-
cated. The international community has difficulty accusing member
states of such a gross violation of human rights, especially given the
definitional strictness of the Genocide Convention. Once the label is
applied, the lack of enforcement mechanisms impedes meaningful
punishment. Attempts to try acts of genocide have previously been
136 Leich, Contemporary Practice of the U.S. Relating to International Law, 80
AM. J. INT'L L. 612, 618 (1986).
-" Genocide Convention, supra note 1, art. II.
,38 Lemkin, supra note 54, at 79.
139 LeBlanc, The Intent to Destroy Groups in the Genocide Convention: The
Proposed U.S. Understanding, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 369, 374 (1984).
140 Id. at 379.
"4 SARTRE, ON GENOCIDE (1968).
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in the context of a weakened or ousted government for crimes already
committed. A discussion of those cases suggests that, although actual
enforcement of the Genocide Convention against Ethiopia is unlikely,
use of the Convention for its symbolic force is still possible.
As previously mentioned, no state or individuals have ever been
punished for committing genocide. The International League for the
Rights of Man formally addressed the United Nations Secretary Gen-
eral, charging the Paraguayan government with genocide, but the
United Nations has taken no action.142 The term genocide was applied
in the Ugandan situation, but the United Nations did little, besides
calling on Amin to conduct an investigation of the allegations. 143
Some kind of international adjudication appears possible against
the Kampuchean government of Pol Pot, but that situation differs
from the Eritrean situation. Documentation of the genocidal acts in
Kampuchea was possible because the Khmer Rouge no longer con-
trolled the territory and the Vietnamese-controlled government gave
permission to gather evidence against the Khmer Rouge.'" Similar
action in Ethiopia is improbable as Mengistu is the sole recognized
ruler of Ethiopia and he will not readily allow foreign observers to
collect evidence against him. Given the reluctance of states to even
interfere in the Eritrean war, no state is likely to bring charges of
genocide against Mengistu to the World Court. The alternative is
trial by a national court.
142 Arens, supra note 108, at 12. The League submitted a similar complaint to
the Organization of American States. The Paraguayan Bishops' Conference and the
Department of Missions of the Paraguayan Conference of Catholic Bishops have
also charged genocide. Arens, supra note 110, at 141. The United States has con-
siderable influence in Paraguay, but the government refuses to confront the Para-
guayan government. The United States will not go beyond informal requests in favor
of Indian rights because of principles of non-intervention in another state's internal
affairs. In all likelihood, the United States is also reluctant to disturb relations with
a strong industrial market. Id. at 147.
143 Kuper, supra note 85, at 139-140. The issue of Idi Amin's actions against the
Ugandan Indians in August, 1971, was immediately raised in the Sub-Commission,
but the members resolved only to recommend consideration of the applicability of
international legal protection of human rights to noncitizens. In 1973, a former
minister of education and the ousted president of Uganda separately wrote to the
Organization of African Unity, charging Amin with the commission of genocide.
Between 1974 and 1976, the Commission submitted five complaints of human rights
violations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Secretary-General
called on Amin to conduct an investigation, but the Commission did not undertake
an investigation until 1978.
'" Stanton, supra note 84, at 342.
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Clearly, Mengistu is not likely to submit himself to punishment by
an Ethiopian court. The example in Bangladesh of the attempted
trial of Pakistani nationals by a Bengali national court was possible
for reasons similar to those allowing trial of the Kampuchean gov-
ernment. Pakistan no longer controlled Bangladesh so the Bengali
government was free to proceed as it wished. Mengistu is responsible
for the acts of genocide against the Eritreans, but he remains in
power in Ethiopia.
Although the chance of actually trying Mengistu for genocide is
slight, the international community is not thereby relieved of its
obligation to react to Mengistu's deliberate starvation of the Eritrean
people. The Genocide Convention has symbolic force as a prohibition
of future acts of genocide, and the world has a duty to focus attention
on Ethiopia to prevent further harm to the Eritrean people.
Mengistu claims he only wants to unite Eritrea with the rest of
Ethiopia,' 45 and not necessarily destroy the people, but his actions
indicate the latter goal. By expelling relief workers, Mengistu took
an important step towards facilitating his genocidal policy. He justi-
fied the expulsion of volunteer organizations as necessary to protect
foreigners caught in the fighting, but others suggest that protection
is a secondary motive.'1 The primary reason for the expulsion, as
mentioned previously, was to allow Mengistu to pursue his genocidal
policies in the northern regions unchecked.' 47 Once the intent to
destroy a particular group of people appears, the term genocide
applies. 14s Article I of the Genocide Convention requires parties not
only punish genocide but also to prevent it.' 49 The drafters stated
that even if the Convention only established that genocide was an
international crime, adoption was necessary to keep the conscience
of humanity constantly on the alert against it.15o Perhaps the greatest
significance of the Genocide Convention is that it labelled and out-
lawed mass murder of particular groups of civilians wherever and
141 INT'L COMM'N JURISTS, supra note 4, at 8.
"4 Hearing, supra note 27, at 22.
4 Id. (Statement of Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau for
African Affairs).
148 Genocide Convention, supra note 1, art. II.
149 Id. art. I.
I" Consideration of the Draft Convention on Genocide, 3(1) U.N. GAOR C.6
(66th mtg.) at 32, U.N. Doc. A/633 (1948) [Comment of Mr. Azkoul of Lebanon].
Comments supporting the Genocide Convention were in response to other delegates
who warned against building up false hopes about what the Convention could actually
accomplish. Id. at 17 [Comment of Sir Hartley Shawcross of the United Kingdom].
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whenever it occurs. Mengistu is currently committing genocide in
Eritrea and the international community has an immediate duty to
prevent more needless extermination.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Genocide Convention was the first United Nations human
rights document. Thus far, the Convention has had symbolic force
in providing the world with a label for atrocious crimes against
humanity, but has remained limited in providing mechanisms for
prosecuting such crimes. Later agreements are more sophisticated and
the United Nations could use them as a model to increase the ef-
fectiveness of the Genocide Convention."' One suggestion for more
effective procedures is the establishment of a tribunal that would try
and punish perpetrators of genocide using international law, including
the Genocide Convention.1 2 The tribunal would initiate preventive
measures and hear petitions of individuals or groups, and an early
warning system could enable the international community to intervene
to prevent or mitigate the results of acts of genocide.'53
Nongovernmental organizations could play a larger role in moni-
toring and reporting acts of genocide. The problem is that human
rights organizations do not want to accuse a government or individual
prematurely of genocide because it may hurt their reputations and
hinder their access to countries to conduct investigations. One sug-
gestion is the establishment of an independent group that deals only
with genocide and that can balance the risks of a premature judgment
of genocide against the danger of ignoring mounting deaths. 5 4 An
important function of the group would be to generate publicity when
genocidal activities occur or are imminent.'55
Article VI of the Genocide Convention provides for trial by an
international penal tribunal, 5 6 and the international community should
work towards its creation. As is suggested in the case of the Kam-
puchean crimes, an international penal tribunal could be established
under a limited charter to hear specific charges of genocide."' The
1 Kutner, supra note 97, at 373.
152 Id.; see also Lippman, supra note 97, at 1.
153 Id.
134 Fein, supra note 125, at 25.
155 Id.
156 Genocide Convention, supra note 1, art. VI.
157 Stanton, supra note 84, at 347.
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Bangladesh attempt to try Pakistani nationals for genocide is evidence
of present legal expectations that the acts of genocide not go un-
punished."' Even in the absence of an international criminal court,
the idea of universal jurisdiction over those who offend all has become
acceptable. 5 9 Meanwhile, the United Nations can make fuller use of
existing procedures to investigate allegations of genocide.
While the international community searches for effective legal mea-
sures to prevent and punish acts of genocide, states must take im-
mediate steps to stop Mengistu from committing genocide in Eritrea.
During United States Senate hearings on Ethiopia, several commen-
tators suggested possible economic and political actions against Ethio-
pia. States could impose trade sanctions against Ethiopian imports
to indicate displeasure with Mengistu's treatment of the Eritreans.160
Requests to the Soviet Union to pressure its ally Mengistu into reform
might also be effective.' 6' The most powerful solution is to keep
world attention focused on Ethiopia to isolate, and if necessary,
delegitimize the Mengistu dictatorship. 62 Most commentators agree
that the only real solution to the problem is to remove Mengistu
completely from power.1 63
While the label of genocide alone is insufficient to halt mass killings,
it is a first step toward international recognition of an obligation to
take action. The drafters noted that while the existence of the Gen-
ocide Convention may not have stopped Hitler from committing
genocide, at least it would have prevented the attitude of tolerance
and made it more difficult. 164 Once the world knows that a country
is committing genocide, all who do not denounce it are accomplices.1 65
The Ethiopian government is committing genocide by deliberately
starving the Eritreans.
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